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The Impact of Economic Freedom and Total Freedom on Gross 
State In-Migration: An Exploratory Study of the Great Recession 
Experience 
 
By Richard J. Cebula, Maggie Foley, and Joshua Hall 
    
Abstract. Typically, the greater the degree of economic freedom, the more successfully 
and efficiently markets perform and the greater the prosperity created through private 
enterprise. These outcomes from greater freedom accelerate economic growth, which in 
turn creates opportunities for yet further success. It can also be argued that greater 
personal freedom promotes higher levels of utility for consumers in non-economic ways. 
Accordingly, the present study empirically investigates whether the prospects of greater 
economic freedom on the one hand and greater economic plus personal freedom, i.e., 
greater total freedom, on the other hand in any given state vis-à-vis other states act(s) to 
induce a greater net influx of migrants. This empirical study of domestic U.S. migration 
during the Great Recession finds clear evidence that migrants prefer to move to those 
states affording higher levels of economic freedom and higher levels of total freedom.   
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Introduction   
 
Migration determinants within the U.S. have been extensively researched, especially for 
the post Vietnam War era (West, Hamilton & Loomis, 1976; Vedder, et al., 1986; Percy, 
Hawkins, & Maier, 1995; Carrington, Detragiache, & Vishwanath, 1996; Nechyba, 2000; 
Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Chi & Voss, 2005; Cebula & Alexander, 2006; 
Partridge & Rickman, 2006; Francis, 2007; Landry, et al., 2007;  
Cebula & Clark, 2013; Plantinga, et al., 2013). The factors considered within the context 
of internal/domestic migration determinants are extremely diverse. By and large, the 
contemporary mainstream migration literature finds migrants being attracted to areas with 
lower living costs, better income prospects, lower taxes, and a warmer climate. 
It is in the spirit of this diversity that the present study seeks to investigate 
whether contemporary domestic migration in the U.S. is influenced by the degree of 
economic freedom and by the degree of total freedom (economic freedom plus personal 
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freedom). More specifically, using the indices of overall economic freedom and overall 
personal freedom developed by Ruger & Sorens (2009) within an otherwise conventional 
migration model, this study empirically investigates whether state-level domestic gross 
in-migration is positively impacted by higher levels of economic freedom higher levels 
and/or by higher levels of total freedom (economic freedom plus personal freedom). 
These latter two factors have effectively been ignored in the mainstream migration 
literature for their potential migration impact.  
Economic growth at the regional level can derive from a variety of sources, 
including in-migration. Indeed, the latter plays an extremely important role in the pattern 
of economic growth across the U.S. In this study, the potential roles of economic freedom 
(treated as an economic trait of each state) on the one hand and total freedom, economic 
plus personal freedom (treated as both an economic trait of each state and a quality of life 
trait of each state), on the other hand on gross state in-migration are investigated for the 
period 2008-2009. In addition, the impact of a variety of economic (including public 
policy) and quality of life factors are included in this study; as stated above, such factors 
have been found in certain previous research to significantly influence migration and thus 
cannot be ignored. Finally, to test the resiliency of the model, estimates are also provided 
that modify and expand the basic model.  
 Interestingly, the index of economic freedom recently developed by Ruger & 
Sorens (2009) includes measures of state sales and cigarette excise tax revenues, state, 
county, and municipal debt burdens, and certain municipal and county tax collections and 
expenditures in each of the 50 states; therefore, these factors are not expressly included in 
this study as separate variables because to do so would effectively be to introduce 
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redundancy. However, following arguments in Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971), the 
effective state income tax rate and per capita state plus local property taxes, which are not 
included in the Ruger and Sorens (2009) data, is expressly included in the present 
empirical analysis among the explanatory economic variables. The adoption of state-level 
data to investigate the impact of state income taxation or other such government policies 
on migration flows can be found in a number of previous studies (Sommers & Suits, 
1973; Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000; Partridge & 
Rickman, 2006; Cebula & Alexander, 2006; Cebula & Clark, 2013).   
  Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom 
Ruger & Sorens (2009, p. 1) predicate their study ultimately on the definition of 
individual freedom as being “…the ability to dispose of one’s own life, liberty, and justly 
acquired property however one sees fit, so long as one does not coercively infringe on 
another’s ability to do the same.” Ruger & Sorens (2009) proceed to develop a number of 
freedom indices, including an elaborate index of overall economic freedom and a 
separate elaborate index of overall personal freedom. This study investigates the impact 
of economic freedom per se and total freedom, which is the sum of economic freedom 
and personal freedom combined, on gross- state in-migration in the U.S. 
In part, as observed above, the overall index of economic freedom consists of a 
fiscal policy dimension involving state sales and cigarette tax revenues, state, county, and 
municipal debt burdens in each state, and certain municipal and county tax collections 
and expenditures in each of the 50 states. However, this index of overall economic 
freedom also consists of a regulatory policy dimension, which considers labor regulation, 
health insurance mandates, occupational licensing, the tort system, eminent domain, and 
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land and environmental regulation (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 8).  The index of overall 
personal freedom reflects the “Paternalism” concept (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 9). 
Interestingly, regulations that have a primarily “paternalistic” justification, such as home- 
and private school regulations, are placed under this measure of freedom, along with 
citizen rights to educate their own children and to be free of unreasonable search and 
seizure.  These indices are argued to be part of the continuing process of improvements in 
the measurement of economic freedom and personal freedom (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 
6). 
 Ruger & Sorens (2009, p. 1, Table, III, Table IV, Table V) argue that they 
improve on previous efforts at measuring freedom across states in three ways. First, they 
include (as observed above) measures of personal and social freedoms such as the rights 
of peaceful citizens to educate their own children and to be free of unreasonable search 
and seizure. In addition, they include measures of the rights of peaceful citizens to be free 
of bans on smoking, to own and carry firearms, and to make free choices involving same-
sex partnerships and marijuana consumption. Second, they include more variables as well 
as more complete data sets in their index construction process than previous studies. 
Third, they observe that they adopt new and more accurate measures of key variables, 
including fiscal policies (tax, expenditure, and debt) by county and municipal 
governments in each state.  For these reasons, Ruger & Sorens (2009, p. 6) claim their 
report “…not only provides a broader framework for understanding the state of freedom 
in the American states, but also more carefully measures the economic components of 
freedom.” 
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 Since the Ruger & Sorens (2009) study is alleged to provide more dependable, 
more accurate, and more robust economic freedom indices and personal freedom indices 
than heretofore available, the Ruger & Sorens (2009) overall economic freedom and 
personal freedom indices are adopted as the freedom measures (economic freedom and 
total freedom) in the present study of determinants of U.S. internal migration. Naturally, 
consistent with the mainstream economics literature on migration determinants, a number 
of additional economic variables (broadly defined) and non-economic variables are 
included in the study. 
   The Framework for Gross In-Migration      
The consumer-voter is treated as regarding migration as an investment decision. 
Accordingly, the decision to migrate from one location to another location requires that 
the consumer’s expected net benefits of moving from the present location to the other 
location be positive. In addition, the actual migration destination must reflect the 
maximum value that could be expected from moving from the present location to any 
other known and plausible alternative destination. Alternatively stated, the migration 
decision is treated as an investment such that one’s decision to migrate from area i to area 
j requires the net discounted present value of migration from area i to area j, DPVij, be (a) 
positive and (b) the maximum net discounted present value that can be expected from 
moving from area i to any other known, plausible alternative destination. Thus, migration 
will flow from area i to area j only if: 
DPVij  > 0; DPVij = MAX for j, where j = 1,2,…,z    (1)  
where z represents all of the known plausible alternative destinations for the consumer-
voter.   
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 Following in principle the standard migration investment model (Riew, 1973), the 
migration decision initially focuses principally on two sets of broad considerations, 
namely: 
1. Economic conditions, including economic freedom [a factor effectively 
overlooked in previous related studies] and certain state and local fiscal variables; 
and 
2. Environmental and quality-of-life factors, including, in half of the estimates 
personal freedom inasmuch as it is one of the components of total freedom as 
defined here [another factor overlooked in previous related studies]. 
In the empirical estimates, initially to measure gross in-migration (GRMIGRATj), 
the gross number of in-migrants to state j over the 2008-2009 time period is first divided 
by the year 2008 population in state j and then the resulting decimal, which lies between -
1.0 and +1.0, is converted to a percent, which obviously can be either a positive or 
negative number.  The alternative estimates express the migration rate thusly computed in 
natural log form, with the models being estimated in semi-log form.  
Five fundamentally economic factors are initially considered in this analysis. The 
first of these is PCPERSINCj, the per capita personal income in state j in the year 2008. 
This variable is initially adopted as a measure of income prospects in state j. Other things 
held the same (ceteris paribus), higher income states should be more attractive to 
migrants because with a higher income people have higher living standards. The second 
variable, COSTOFLIVj, measures the overall cost of living in state j for the average four-
person family in the year 2008. This variable is expressed as an index, with the mean of 
this variable being approximately 100.00. The expected impact of a higher cost of living 
 7 
on migration is negative. This is because, ceteris paribus, a higher overall cost of living 
would reduce a family unit’s purchasing power and hence its living standard. The 
variable STINCTAXRj is the effective state income tax rate in state j in the year 2008. 
The higher the state income burden in a state, the lower the level of disposable family 
income, ceteris paribus, and hence the less appealing the state is as a migration 
destination (Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). 
Adoption of this variable has at least two rationales: (1) this variable is entirely omitted 
from the Ruger & Sorens (2009) economic freedom measure and (2) inclusion of this 
variable (as argued in Cebula & Alexander, 2006) is in principle consistent with 
arguments in both Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971). Similarly, the variable 
STLOPROTXPCj is the per capita state plus local property tax in state j in 2007. 
Naturally, it is expected that in-migration should be a decreasing function of this variable, 
ceteris paribus, since the higher its value the lower the disposable income level. 
The fifth economic variable in the analysis, but the economic variable of greatest 
interest in this study, is the measure of economic freedom, ECONFREEj. This variable is 
expressed in the form of an index, and it endeavors to quantify the degree of economic 
freedom in state j. The values of this variable vary widely across states and can lie in the 
range of (-1), which would correspond to the lowest possible degree of economic 
freedom, to (+1), which would correspond to the highest possible degree of economic 
freedom. The formal role of ECONFREEj per se in a migration analysis appears to be 
essentially unstudied (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 2). According to the latter study, gross    
in-migration should be an increasing function of economic freedom, ceteris paribus, as a 
reflection of the desirability of greater economic freedom. 
 8 
To measure environmental and quality-of-life conditions in state j, we initially 
consider three factors. The first is AVEJANTEMPj, the average daily temperature in 
January in state j (1971-2000), as a measure of climatic conditions. It is commonplace in 
migration studies of the U.S. to hypothesize and to find empirically that migrants on 
average prefer residence in warmer climates (Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 1998; Conway 
& Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). Thus, 
gross domestic in-migration is expected to be positively related to AVEJANTEMPj, 
ceteris paribus. To reflect environmental quality, the variable TOXICHEMRj is adopted.  
Variable TOXICHEMRj is defined as the number of pounds per capita of toxic chemical 
releases in state j in the year 2000. Presumably, for health reasons, migrants would prefer 
residence in states with lower levels of toxic chemical releases, ceteris paribus (Saltz, 
1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000; Cebula & Alexander, 
2006). As a reflection of another dimension of the quality of life in state j, namely, 
recreation, we introduce the per capita level of state parks accessible to the public in each 
state, STPKSPCj. Arguably, gross in-migration is expected to be an increasing function 
of this variable since the more accessible/plentiful the parks are, the greater the 
recreational value of residing in the state, ceteris paribus. 
The definitions and data sources for each of the nine variables described above 
are provided in Table 1. In addition, the means and standard deviations for each of the 
variables are provided in Table 2. It may be worth noting that the mean values for the 
economic freedom (ECONFREEj) and personal freedom (PERSFREEj) indices are 
+0.00398 and +0.00204, respectively. At first glance, these latter two averages may seem 
very low; however, in theory, these freedom indices could lie between -1.0 (for low) and 
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+1.0 (for high).1 Thusly viewed, the average value for ECONFREEj and PERSFREEj 
may not seem extraordinarily low. The study includes all 50 states.  
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix among the explanatory variables, where it 
is revealed that there are no multicollinearity problems. However, the introduction of the 
personal freedom variable (PERSFREEj), as a separate variable, does introduce 
multicollinearity problems into the study framework; Therefore, rather than expressly 
introducing PERSFREEj as a distinct separate variable in any of the models in this study, 
we introduce personal freedom into the analysis by combining it with economic freedom 
to create the total freedom variable (TOTALFREEj) considered later on in the study.  
Initial Empirical Results  
The fundamental focus in this study is on the impact of economic freedom and economic 
plus personal freedom, i.e., total freedom, on gross in-migration. As explained in the 
preceding section of this study, the migration decision is a complex one. Thus, although 
the roles of economic freedom and total freedom in the migration decision can be studied, 
it is nevertheless necessary to allow for the additional factors that influence migration. 
Indeed, based upon the framework developed above, migration (GRMIGRAT) is 
potentially influenced not only by economic freedom (ECONFREE) and total freedom, 
but also by the levels of PCPERSINC, the COSTOFLIV, the STINCTAXR, the 
STLOPROTXPC, the AVEJANTEMP, TOXICHEMR, and  STPKSPC.  
The model initially focuses upon economic freedom and is first estimated in linear 
form, as expressed in equation (2) below:  
                                                          
1 The reader may be interested in the fact that the actual high and low for the 
ECONFREEj variable are 0.405 and -0.589, respectively, whereas the actual high and 
low for the PERSFREEj variable are + 0.272 and -0.294, respectively. 
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GRMIGRRATj = a0 + a1 PCPERSINCj + a2 COSTOFLIVj + a3 STLOPROTXPCj 
+ a4 STINCTAXRj + a5 ECONFREEj  +  a6 AVEJANTEMPj  
+ a7 TOXICHEMRj  + a8 STPKSPCj  +  u    (2)  
where a0 = constant term and u = the stochastic error term. Based upon the preceding 
discussion, the following coefficient signs are hypothesized: 
a1 >0, a2 <0, a3 <0, a4 <0, a5 > 0, a6 > 0, a7 < 0, a8 > 0   (3) 
To test the consistency and resiliency of the model, the semi-log form of the 
above equation that is also estimated by OLS is  
log(GRMIGRRATj) = b0 + b1 PCPERSINCj + b2 COSTOFLIVj  
+ b3 STLOPROTXPCj + b4 STINCTAXRj + b5 ECONFREEj  
 + b6 AVEJANTEMPj + b7 TOXICHEMRj  + b8  STPKSPCj +  u’  (4) 
where log(GRMIGRRATj) is the natural log of net migration, GRMIGRRATj, and is 
computed as already described earlier in this study. 
 The initial results of the formal empirical analysis are provided in Table 4. It is 
noteworthy that in all of the estimations in this study, the White (1980) heteroskedsaticity 
correction is adopted. In any case, in columns (a) and (b) of Table 4, the results of 
estimating equations (2) and (4), respectively, are provided.  In column (a) of Table 4, all 
eight of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs; furthermore, all of these 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level or beyond. With a coefficient of 
determination (R2) equal to 0.74, the statistical analysis explains roughly three-fourths of 
the variation gross state in-migration rate that occurred over the 2008-2009 study period. 
Finally, the F-statistic is statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall 
strength of the model. 
 11 
Most pertinent to the focus in this study, when examining the estimation results 
on migration and its determinants, is the strong empirical support for the following 
hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of economic freedom. As revealed in column 
(a), at the 2.5% statistical significance level, gross in-migration is positively related to 
economic freedom; that is, the higher the degree of economic freedom in a state, other 
things held the same, the greater the gross in-migration rate. 
 In addition, from the remaining results shown in column (a) of Table 4, one can 
also infer the following impacts of the remaining variables on migration: 
1. At the 3% statistical significance level,  the higher the personal income tax 
rate in a state, other things held the same, the lower the gross in-migration 
rate; 
2. At the 1% statistical significance level, the higher the cost of living in a state 
in a state, other things held the same, the smaller the gross in-migration rate; 
3. At the 1% statistical significance level, the higher the per capita property tax 
burden in a state, other things held the same, the smaller the gross in-
migration rate;  
4. At the 1% statistical significance level, the higher the average daily January 
temperature in a state, other things held the same, the greater the gross in-
migration rate; 
5. At the 1% statistical significance level, the higher the number of state parks 
per capita, the greater the gross in-migration rate; 
6. At the 3% statistical significance level, the higher the per capita level of toxic 
chemical releases, the lower the gross in-migration rate; and 
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7. At the 5% statistical significance level, the higher the per capita personal 
income level, the greater the gross in-migration rate. 
Next, we consider the results of estimating the model [equation (4)] with the 
migration variable expressed in natural log form, a common statistical framework for 
studying migration determinants; indeed, expressing migration flows in logarithmic form 
has been practiced for a number of years (Cebula, 1974; Falaris, 1979; Justman, Levy, & 
Gabriel, 1988; Carlos, 2002). In any event, these semi-log estimation results are provided 
in column (b) of Table 4. Not surprisingly, estimates (a) and (b) are qualitatively very 
similar to one another. This is because both statistical estimates are dealing with the same 
explanatory variables and only the dependent variable (migration) is expressed 
differently.  In any case, in column (b) of Table 4, once again, all eight estimated 
coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with six of these being statistically significant at 
the 1% level and two being statistically significant at the 5% level. The R2 of 0.77 
indicates that the model explains more than three-fourths of the gross in-migration rate 
variation. The F-statistic is once again statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Of course, the most relevant of the results shown in column (b), in terms of the 
focus in this study, is the additional strong statistical support for the following hypotheses 
regarding the impacts of economic and personal freedom on domestic migration. At the 
2% statistical significance level, gross state in-migration is positively related to economic 
freedom; that is, the higher the degree of economic freedom in a state, other things held 
the same, the greater the gross in-migration rate (as measured, i.e., in natural log form. 
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The remaining results in column (b) imply that gross in-migration was an increasing 
function of PCPERSINC, AVEJANTEMP, and STPKSPC, while being a decreasing 
function of COSTOFLIV, STLOPROTXPC, TOXICHEMR, and STINCTAXR.  
    Total Economic Freedom 
To further test the consistency and resiliency of the basic model, equations (2) and (4) are 
re-estimated with the variable ECONFREEDOMj replaced by TOTALEFREEDOMj , i.e., 
the sum of ECONFREEDOMj and PERSFREEj. These estimations involve the following 
reduced-form equations:  
GRMIGRRATj = a0 + a1 PCPERSINCj + a2 COSTOFLIVj + a3 STLOPROTXPCj 
+ a4 STINCTAXRj + a5 TOTALFREEj  +  a6 AVEJANTEMPj  
+ a7 TOXICHEMRj  + a8 STPKSPCj  +  u”     (5)  
log(GRMIGRRATj) = b0 + b1 PCPERSINCj + b2 COSTOFLIVj  
+ b3 STLOPROTXPCj + b4 STINCTAXRj + b5 TOTALFREEj  
 +  b6 AVEJANTEMPj + b7 TOXICHEMRj  + b8  STPKSPCj +  u’”  (6) 
The results from estimating these two equations are provided in columns (a) and 
(b) of Table 5 for the 2008-2009 gross state in-migration rate and the natural log thereof, 
respectively. As would presumably be expected, these results parallel those in Table 4. In 
both of the columns in Table 5, all eight of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected 
signs and are statistically significant at beyond the 5% level. In point of fact, in column 
(a) of Table 5, four coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, with four 
coefficients being statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas in column (b), five 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, with three coefficients statistically 
significant at the 5% level. As for the total economic freedom variable, its coefficient is 
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now statistically significant at the 2.5% level in column (a) and at the 1% level in column 
(b). 
Thus, based on these results, the gross state in-migration rate to state j is an 
increasing function of not only total freedom (economic freedom plus personal freedom) 
in the state but also an increasing function of per capita personal income, the average 
January temperature, and the number of state parks per capita in the state. In addition, the 
migration rate to state j is a decreasing function of the cost of living in the state, the per 
capita property taxes, the effective state income tax rate in the state, and toxic chemical 
releases in the state.  In any case, there is further affirmation, as hypothesized in this 
study and also supported statistically in columns (a) and (b) of Table 4, that the higher the 
values of the freedom index (in this case the total freedom index consisting of economic 
freedom and personal freedom combined) that exist in a state, the more attractive that 
state is to would-be migrants, ceteris paribus.   
   Testing for Robustness 
The results provided in this study for the economic freedom and total freedom variables 
are in fact robust across a wide variety of specifications. To illustrate this robustness, we 
provide empirical results for a multi-faceted variation on the basic model which (a) adds 
three additional quality of life variables for each state, one allowing for coastal location 
(COASTj), one allowing for cooling degree days (CDDj), and one allowing for the 
presence of hazardous waste sites in each state (HAZARDj) while (b) altering the form of 
the income variable in each state to so reflect unemployment rates and thereby create an 
arguably better measure of expected income potential in each state (EXPPCPERSINCj).   
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 In particular, the following reduced-from equations are now to be estimated, with 
results provided in Table 6: 
GRMIGRRATj = a0 + a1 EXPPCPERSINCj + a2 COSTOFLIVj + a3 STLOPROTXPCj 
+ a4 STINCTAXRj + a5 ECONFREEj  +  a6 AVEJANTEMPj + a7 TOXICHEMRj   
+ a8 STPKSPCj  + a9 COASTj + a10 CDDj +a11 HAZARDj + u””   (7)  
log(GRMIGRRATj) = b0 + b1 EXPPCPERSINCj + b2 COSTOFLIVj + b3STLOPROTXPCj 
+ b4 STINCTAXRj + b5 ECONFREEj  +  b6 AVEJANTEMPj + b7 TOXICHEMRj   
+ b8 STPKSPCj + b9 COASTj + b10 CDDj + b11 HAZARDj + u’””   (8) 
GRMIGRRATj = a0 + a1 EXPPCPERSINCj + a2 COSTOFLIVj + a3 STLOPROTXPCj 
+ a4 STINCTAXRj + a5 TOTALFREEj  +  a6 AVEJANTEMPj + a7 TOXICHEMRj   
+ a8 STPKSPCj  + a9 COASTj + a10 CDDj +a11 HAZARDj + u””’   (9)  
log(GRMIGRRATj) = b0 + b1 EXPPCPERSINCj + b2 COSTOFLIVj + b3STLOPROTXPCj 
+ b4 STINCTAXRj + b5 TOTALFREEj  +  b6 AVEJANTEMPj + b7 TOXICHEMRj   
+ b8 STPKSPCj + b9 COASTj + b10 CDDj + b11 HAZARDj + u’”””  (10)  
 The specifications in these four equations differ from those considered earlier in 
this study in four ways. First, there is the substitution of variable EXPPCPERSINCj for 
variable PCPERSINCj. Variable EXPPCPERSINCj is interpreted here as representing 
expected per capita personal income and differs from PCPERSINCj because it considers 
the unemployment rate in state j. In particular, the variable EXPPCPERSINCj, the 
expected per capita personal income in state j in the year 2008, is computed as unity 
minus the year 2008 unemployment rate in state j, UNRj (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, 
Table 580), expressed as a decimal, multiplied times the year 2008 per capita personal 
income level in state j, PCPERSINCj: 
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 EXPPCPERSINCj = (1-UNRj) x PCPERSINCj    (11) 
This variable is adopted as a potentially more realistic measure of expected income 
prospects in state j than PCPERSINCj (Saltz, 1998) inasmuch as it involves not only a 
measure of income in state j but also a measure of the likelihood of obtaining that income 
level should one move to the state in question. Other things held the same, states with 
higher expected income levels should be more attractive to migrants because with a 
higher income people have higher living standards. 
 The remaining three variables are all adopted as additional dimension of 
(measures of) the quality of life in state j. COASTj is a dummy variable with a value of 1 
if some border or borders of state j directly lie on either the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific 
Ocean, and/or the Gulf of Mexico. Since such location is presumably deemed desirable 
because of recreational access and other considerations (Cebula & Alexander, 2006), the 
expected sign on the coefficient for COASTj is positive, ceteris paribus. Cooling degrees 
per annum, CDDj (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, Table 376), reflect the degree to which the 
heat and humidity in state j both are climatically uncomfortable and require greater 
amounts of air conditioning. Presumably, the coefficient on this variable would be 
negative (Saltz, 1998; Cebula & Alexander, 2006), ceteris paribus. Finally, the third new 
expressly quality-of-life variable reflects the relative presence of hazardous waste sites in 
a state in 2008. In particular, the variable HAZARDPCTj (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, 
Table 371) indicates the percentage of all hazardous waste sites in the U.S. that is located 
in state j. Given the multi-faceted undesirability of such waste sites, it is expected that 
gross in-migration is a decreasing function of HAZARDPCTj, ceteris patribus. 
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 The estimates of equations (7) through (10) are provided, respectively, in columns 
(a) through (d) of Table 6. As shown in this Table, 40 of the 44 estimated coefficients 
exhibit the expected signs are are statistically significant at the 5% level or beyond. Only 
the coefficients on COASTj are all statistically insignificant. Overall, these results provide 
consistent empirical support for the results in Tables 4 and 5 and serve as a test of 
robustness in so doing. Among other things, the findings in Table 6 reveal that the gross 
state in-migration rate over the study period was an increasing function of expected per 
capita personal income, warmer January temperatures, greater availability of state parks, 
while being a decreasing function of the cost of living, the per capita property tax, the 
effective state personal income tax rate, and the presence of higher levels of toxic 
chemical emissions, as well as cooling degree days and the presence of hazardous waste 
sites. The last two of these results are new to this study, whereas the very first of these 
results is an enhancement of the finding in this study for the income variable 
(PCPERSINCj) in Tables 4 and 5.  
Finally, in Table 6, the estimated coefficients on the economic freedom and total 
freedom variables are all positive, as hypothesized, with thee being statistically 
significant at the 1% level and the other being statistically significant at beyond the 2% 
level. Moreover, the coefficient sizes in Table 6 are comparable to their counterparts in 
Tables 4 and 5. Thus, both economic freedom and total freedom acted to attract in-
migration over the study period and there is reason to believe that the results are robust.  
Conclusion 
This study has statistically investigated the impacts of economic freedom and total 
freedom on gross domestic in-migration at the state level in the U.S. for the 2008-2009 
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period. The overall results of the formal empirical analysis are provided in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6. From the viewpoint of the objective of this study, the most germane of these 
statistical findings are that gross domestic in-migration is positively impacted by both 
higher levels of economic freedom and higher levels of total freedom (the sum of 
economic freedom and personal freedom in each state), as suggested in Ruger & Sorens 
(2009). Thus, there is evidence strongly suggesting that states offering higher levels of 
economic freedom and total freedom can be expected to experience higher gross in-
migration rates and hence higher population and economic growth rates, ceteris paribus. 
The challenges faced by many states appear obvious. Indeed, this study offers words of 
advice to state legislatures and governors as well as elected and other officials in state 
and local government: “to the victor go the spoils”--because households “vote with their 
feet” in seeking economic and total freedom. Enacting policies that infringe upon these 
freedoms will be costly over time and not serve the best interest of the citizens of the 
state.  
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Table 1: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources (in parentheses)  
GRMIGRRATj = the gross number of in-migrants into state j over the July, 2008-July, 
2009 time period as a percent of state j’s 2008 population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, 
Tables 12 and 15) 
 
PCPERSINCj = the median family income in state j in the year 2008 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010, Table 572) 
 
COSTOFLIVj = average cost of living for a four-person family in state j in the year 2008 
(ACCRA, 2009) 
 
STINCTAXRj = the effective average state personal income rate in state j in the year 2008 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, Table 455) 
 
STLOPROTXPCj = the per capita level of state plus local property taxes in state j, 2007 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, Tables 455, 17) 
 
ECONFREEj = an index measuring the level of economic freedom in state j, with the 
index lying in the range of -1.0 to +1.0 (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 47)  
 
AVEJANTEMPj = the average daily temperature in January in state j (over the 1971-2000 
reference period), as a measure of warm climatic conditions in the state (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005, Table 378) 
 
TOXICHEMRj = a measure of pollution, expressed in the form of the number of pounds 
per capita in state j of toxic chemical releases in the year 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010, Tables 376, 12) 
 
PERSFREEj = an index measuring the level of personal freedom in state j, with the index 
lying in the range of -1.0 to +1.0 (Ruger & Sorens, 2009, p. 47)  
 
TOTALFREEDOMj = ECONFREEj + PERSFREEj 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Mean (Arithmetic Average) Standard Deviation 
GRMIGRRATj   2.91    1.038    
PCPERSINCj    38,589    5,939 
COSTOFLIVj    100.00    17.31 
STLOPROTXPCj   459    571 
STINCTAXRj    2.897    1.962 
ECONFREEj     0.00398   0.2238 
AVEJANTEMPj   32.71    12.65 
TOXICHEMRj   7.42    9.79 
 
TOTALFREEDOMj  0.006    0.26 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
       PCPERSINC COSTOFLIV STLOPROTXPC STINCTAXR ECONFREE AVEJANTEMP TOXICHEMR STPKSPC  
 
PCPERSINC  1.000   
COSTOFLIV 0.278 1.000  
STLOPROTXPC  0.378 -0.242      1.000 
STINCTAXR  0.322 0.038      0.261     1.000 
ECONFREE   -0.313 -0.052     -0.300    -0.341        1.000 
AVEJANTEMP  -0.198 0.088       0.150    -0.235      -0.069              1.000 
TOXICHEMR -0.376 -0.185       0.286   -0.150       0.336              0.219                1.000 
 
STPKSPC  0.131  0.288      -0.106    -0.226      -0.256             -0.101  -0.154            1.000 
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Table 4. Initial Empirical Results: Economic Freedom 
 
Dependent Variable    GRMIGRRATj  Log GRMIGRRATj 
Variable\Coefficient  (a)   (b) 
 
Constant   2.588   0.993    
 
PCPERSINC   0.00005*  0.00002* 
    (2.04)   (2.49) 
   
COSTOFLIV   -0.015**  -0.0067** 
    (-2.94)   (-4.09) 
 
STLOPROTXPC  -0.00009**  -0.00004 
    (-3.34)   (-4.38) 
 
STINCTAXR   -0.126*  -0.037** 
    (-2.23)   (-2.60) 
 
ECONFREE   1.03*   0.382** 
    (2.32)   (2.64) 
 
AVEJANTEMP  0.02*   0.0089** 
    (2.42)   (3.04) 
 
TOXICHEMR   -0.009*  -0.003* 
    (-2.28)   (-2.20) 
 
STPKSPC   0.547**  0.149** 
    (3.37)   (3.16) 
 
R2    0.74   0.77 
adjR2    0.69   0.72 
F    14.62**  16.99** 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. **indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; 
*indicates statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 5. Additional Empirical Results: Total Freedom 
 
Dependent Variable    NETMIGRRATj  Log NETMIGRRATj 
Variable\Coefficient  (a)   (b) 
 
Constant   2.29   0.886    
 
PCPERSINC   0.00006*  0.00002** 
    (2.40)   (2.98) 
   
COSTOFLIV   -0.016**  -0.007** 
    (-3.17)   (-4.41) 
 
STLOPROTXPC  -0001**  -0.00004** 
    (-3.48)   (-4.45) 
 
STINCTAXR   -0.113*  -0.0332* 
    (-2.13)   (-2.38) 
 
TOTALFREE   0.99*   0.357** 
    (2.49)   (2.65) 
 
AVEJANTEMP  0.021**  0.009** 
    (2.66)   (3.28) 
 
TOXICHEMR   -0.0088*  -0.003* 
    (-2.37)   (-2.25) 
 
STPKSPC   0.498**  0.13** 
    (3.92)   (3.34) 
 
R2    0.75   0.77 
adjR2    0.70   0.73 
F    15.01**  17.37** 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. **indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; 
*indicates statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 6. Further Empirical Results: Economic Freedom, Total Freedom 
 
Dependent Variable NETMIGRRATj      Log NETMIGRRATj   NETMIGRRATj Log NETMIGRRATj 
 
Variable\Coefficient   (a)          (b)                (c)  (d) 
 
Constant        1.94          0.82  1.67  0.72    
 
EXPPCPERSINC        0.0000007**         0.0000002** 0.0000007*** 0.000003** 
        (3.02)        (3.66)  (3.54)  (3.99) 
   
COSTOFLIV       -0.016**        -0.0066**  -0.168** -0.0069** 
        (-3.45)        (-4.64)  (-3.73)  (-4.97) 
 
STLOPROTXPC       -000001*        -0.00003*  -0.00007* -0.00003** 
       (-2.20)       (-2.59)  (-2.36)  (-2.78) 
 
STINCTAXR       -0.102*       -0.0299*  -0.09*  --0.026* 
       (-2.28)       (-2.42)  (-2.04)  (-2.09) 
 
ECONFREE        1.05*       0.385**  -------  ------- 
         (2.53)       (2.82) 
 
TOTALFREE       -------      -------   0.97**  0.347** 
             (2.71)  (2.79) 
 
AVEJANTEMP       0.047**      0.017**  0.047**  0.017** 
       (3.78)     (4.38)   (3.68)  (4.22) 
 
TOXICHEMR     -0.0079*    -0.003*  -0.0075* -0.0026* 
     (-2.18)    (-2.03)   (-2.25)  (-2.04) 
 
STPKSPC    0.557**    0.146**  0.51**  0.129** 
    (3.91)    (3.41)   (3.38)  (3.96) 
 
COASTj    -0.38     -0.094   -0.38  -0.096 
    (-1.52)     (-1.29)   (-1.53)  (-1.25) 
 
CDDj    -0.0003*    -0.0001**  -0.00031* -0.00009** 
    (-2.47)     (-2.83)   (-2.48)  (-2.77) 
 
HAZARDPCTj   -0.134*   -0.52*   -0.13*  -0.05* 
    (-2.43)    (-2.41)   (-2.46)  (-2.43) 
 
R2  0.79   0.81   0.79  0.81 
adjR2  0.72    0.75   0.73  0.75 
F  12.61**  14.52**   12.87**  14.71** 
 
Terms in parentheses are t-values. **indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; *indicates 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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